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I. INTRODUCTION
"I was ripped away from my culture long before I was
born .... In the '20s and '30s many of our people were
migrant workers, but when the Industrial Revolution
kicked in most of them wound up working in the cities
.... [M]y mother was raised in the city because when her
mother was growing up, she'd have been beaten in the
residential schools if she spoke her native language. So,
she came to believe it was important to teach her daugh-
ter to live like a white person."'
This statement, made by a member of the Iroquois Nation in
the spring of 1996, explains one of the past abuses2 by state welfare
authorities against tribes and Indians and illustrates the long-
lasting impact those abuses have had. Those abuses, and a fear of
the "cultural genocide, 3 they might cause, led to the enactment of
the Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978. 4 The Act's stated policy is
to set standards to govern removal of Indian children from their
families and provide "placement of such children in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian cul-
ture."5 To accomplish its stated purpose, the Act sets out special
rights and protections in custody proceedings involving any child
who is either "(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe.",
6
However, eighteen years later, and ignoring the fact that past
abusive Indian child welfare practices often have a long-term rip-
ple effect, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District
determined that the Act did not apply to children whose parents
had become "fully assimilated into non-Indian culture, 7 and did
1. Kristine McKenna, Leader of the Path, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1996, at F1
(quoting Gary Farmer).
2. For a discussion of the abuses leading up to the Act, see infra notes 38-44 and
accompanying text.
3. Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152,162 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
4. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3078 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994)) [hereinafter ICWA or "the Act"].
5. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
6. Id. § 1903(4). The Act effectively gives the tribes the right of first refusal in de-
termining placement of children who, for whatever reasons, are not to remain with their
Indian parent(s). See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
7. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1507, 49 Cal. Rptr. 507, 526 (1996), re-
view denied. While several recent cases have similarly invoked the exception, see, e.g.,
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not have "a significant social, cultural or political relationship"
with a tribe.8 The Indian children in In re Bridget R. are twin girls
of an American Indian father who is a member of the federally-
recognized Porno tribe and a mother of the Mexican Indian Yaqui
tribe.9 Although the twin's parents had initially consented to an
adoption of the children, they soon changed their minds. Along
with the Indian children's paternal grandmother and tribe, they
petitioned under the ICWA to have the children returned and
placed with the paternal Indian family, as required by the Act's
placement preferences.0
The California court's restriction of the Act to children whose
parents have "significant" ties to their tribe exemplifies the
"existing Indian family exception." The exception acts to deny the
tribes the right to establish or renew ties with children born to
tribal members who, because of the past abuses the ICWA was
created to remedy, may have left the reservation and become as-
similated into non-Indian culture. The exception is a state court
In re Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (1996), the court in
Bridget R. has issued the most fully developed discussion of the exception, using it as a
test of the ICWA's constitutionality.
8. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1492, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516. During the time
that the Bridget R. case was making its way through the California court system, adop-
tion bills were presented before both houses of Congress which would similarly limit
the application of the ICWA. See H.R. 1448, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 764, 104th Cong.
(1995). These bills were introduced by the Congresswoman and Senator of the adop-
tive parents in the Bridget R. case. James Rainey, A Test of Indian Law, L.A. TIMES,
June 7,1995, at B1, B4. On May 10, 1996, the House passed a bill that would make the
ICWA inapplicable to "child custody proceedings involving a child whose parents do
not maintain affiliation with their Indian tribe." H.R. 3286, 104th Cong. (1996). How-
ever, that bill proved so divisive that the Senate continued to work on compromise bills.
Eventually, Senator John McCain of Arizona, chair of the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs, introduced a separate bill which incorporates some of the detailed proposals
from the National Congress of American Indians. This bill includes new guarantees of
early and effective notice to the tribes in all Indian child custody proceedings, with new
strict time restrictions on both the rights of tribes to intervene-changing 25 U.S.C. §
1911(c), which allows the tribe to intervene "at any point"-and the right of parents to
revoke their consent to adoption. S. 1962, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). John McCain,
Amity in Indian Adoptions, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1996, at A21. Notably, this bill in-
cludes no existing Indian family limitation. The bill was passed by the Senate on Sep-
tember 26, 1996, and sent to the House. It remains to be seen what Congress's final bill
will do to the ICWA and whether the president will sign it. The Clinton administration
has already voiced concern that a measure including the existing Indian family excep-
tion "could violate tribes' self-governance." Eric Schmitt, Adoption Bill Facing Battle
Over Measure on Indians, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,1996, at A19.
9. See Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1492,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
10. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1493-96,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 516-18
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creation, appended to a federal act which Congress passed to pro-
tect tribal existence and culture by preserving the tribes' most vital
resource-their children.11 It has been created by the state courts
despite congressional findings that "the States and their courts
[are] partly responsible for the problem [the ICWA was enacted]
to correct. '' 12 And, since the exception changes the effect of the
ICWA and creates law affecting Indian tribes and their members,
it is judicial lawmaking that is expressly forbidden to the states.
A. The General Trust Responsibility to Indians
Congress has exclusive and "extraordinarily broad ' 14 power
over Indian matters based on the special relationship that exists
between the federal government and Indian tribes. This relation-
ship is based on the fact that "'Indian tribes are unique aggrega-
tions possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members
and their territory.'"'15 This sovereignty "is of a unique and limited
character."16 It exists only at Congress's will and is subject to
complete dissolution. "But until Congress acts, the tribes retain
their existing sovereign powers."18 The United States Supreme
Court has found this unique relationship underlying the tribes' le-
gal status "sui generis.' 9
The tribes, as "quasi-sovereign nations . . . by government
structure, culture, and source of sovereignty[,] are in many ways
foreign to the constitutional institutions of the Federal and State
Governments. ' 20 As recognized in the earliest cases dealing with
Indians, "[t]he very term 'nation,' so generally applied to [Indians],
means 'a people distinct from others.' 2 1 A nation, therefore, is "a
distinct community, occupying its own territory,... in which the
laws of [a state] can have no force.. . ."22 Because of the tribes'
11. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,49 (1989).
12. Id at 45.
13. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
14. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,72 (1978).
15. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)); see also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,
645 (1977) (citations omitted).
16. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
17. See id,
18. Id
19. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,554 (1974).
20. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 71.
21. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,559 (1832).
22. Id at 561.
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status as sovereign nations, the United States Constitution there-
fore affords to Congress the sole authority to "regulate Commerce
... with the Indian Tribes."'' The Indian Commerce Clause, in ef-
fect, makes all Indian relations "the exclusive province of federal
law.
24
When exercising the power within its "exclusive province,"
the federal government's relation with the tribes, who have been
"denominated domestic dependent nations[,] ... resembles that of
a ward to his guardian."' And because this dependent nation "in
order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protec-
tion of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of
government... [,]" the U.S. government is said to have a "trust
obligation 27 toward the tribes.
Congress's exercise of its "trust obligation" in recent years has
been marked by a "legislative trend2'' toward tribal self-
government. Beginning with the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934,29 Congress's "intent and purpose" has been "'to rehabilitate
the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance to develop the
initiative destroyed by a generation of oppression and paternal-
ism.' 3 To this end, "Congress repeatedly has enacted various
preferences... to give Indians a greater participation in their own
self-government."'
Since "'[s]elf-government... is the right to choose culture,"'3 2
it is not surprising that these "recent laws recognize distinctly In-
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,234 (1985).
25. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,17 (1831).
26. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
27. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541-42.
28. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 663 (1982). Cohen lists
the Civil Rights Act-which included six titles on Indian matters-25 U.S.C. 88 1301-
1341 (1994); the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)-(n)
(1994); the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 469 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994)); and the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994), as examples of this "trend." COHEN,
supra, at 661-62 (citations omitted).
29. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479.
30. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145,152 (1973) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 1804, at 6 (1934)).
31. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541.
32. Donna J. Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights: The Indian Child Welfare
Act, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 9 (1990) (alteration in original) (quoting RUSSEL L.
BARSH & JAMES Y. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY
118 (1980)).
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dian cultural values as civil rights."33 However,
[c]ulturally, the chances of Indian survival are signifi-
cantly reduced if [Indian] children, the only real means
for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised
in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of
their People.... [T]hese practices seriously undercut the
tribes' ability to continue as self-governing communities.4
Therefore, part of the "trust responsibility owed to the Indian
tribes by the United States [is] to protect their resources and fu-
ture."35 Congress thus declared in the Indian Child Welfare Act
that it sought
to protect the best interests of Indian children and to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families by the establishment of minimum Federal stan-
dards for the removal of Indian children from their fami-
lies and the placement of such children in foster or adop-
tive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian
culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in
the operation of child and family service programs.
This notion of "Indian sovereignty [is the] ... backdrop against
which the applicable [Indian] statute[] must be read.,
37
B. The Trust Responsibility as Manifested in the ICWA
The ICWA was enacted in response to Congress's "rising con-
cern in the mid-1970's over the consequences to Indian children,
Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices
that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children
from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care
33. COHEN, supra note 28, at 662 (citing the Indian Child Welfare Act as an exam-
ple of a law that recognizes Indian cultural values as a civil right).
34. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34 (1989)
(quoting The Indian Child Welfare AcL Hearings on S. 1214 Before the House of Repre-
sentatives Subcomm on Indian Affairs and Public Lands, 95th Cong. 190, 193 (1978)
[hereinafter S. 1214 Hearings] (statement of Chief Calvin Issac, member of the National
Tribal Chairmen's Association)).
35. Jill E. Adams, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Protecting Tribal Interests
in a Land of Individual Rights, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 301, 312 (1994) (quoting 124
CONG. REc. 38,102 (1978)).
36. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
37. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); see also
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 545 (analyzing the Indian preference in terms of the Equal Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972).
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placement, usually in non-Indian homes."38  Congress was pre-
sented with statistical studies showing that "25 to 35% of all Indian
children had been separated from their families and placed in
adoptive families, foster care, or institutions."39 One commentator
has observed that "[t]he risk for Indian children of being involun-
tarily separated from their parents was in many states up to one
thousand times greater than for non-Indian children."' Testifying
before Congress, Chief Calvin Issac found such separation "[o]ne
of the most serious failings" of the pre-ICWA system in which
Indian children are removed from the custody of their
natural parents by nontribal government authorities who
have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and
social premises underlying Indian home life and childrear-
ing. Many of the individuals who decide the fate of our
children are at best ignorant of our cultural values, and at
worst contemptful of the Indian way and convinced that
removal, usually to a non-Indian household or institution,
can only benefit an Indian child.41
Congress found these statistics so important that they were codi-
fied in 25 U.S.C. § 1901:
Congress finds-
(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the con-
tinued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
children ....
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families
are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by nontribal public and private agen-
cies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such chil-
dren are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes
and institutions; and
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction
38. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32.
39. Id. (citing Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 14, 15
(1974) [hereinafter Program Hearings] (statement of William Byler)).
40. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe: The Indian Child
Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DET. L. RaV. 451, 454 (1989)
(footnote omitted).
41. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34-35 (quoting S. 1214 Hearings, supra note 34, at 191-
92).
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over Indian child custody proceedings through adminis-
trative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize
the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cul-
tural and social standards prevailing in Indian communi-
ties and families.42
Thus, the Act is Congress's exercise of its trust responsibility to
preserve the tribes as sovereign nations by protecting "the rights of
the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian commu-
nity and tribe in retaining its children in its society."43 The ICWA
therefore enacts Congress's intent that "'an Indian child should
remain in the Indian community' ... by making sure that Indian
child welfare determinations are not based on 'a white, middle-
class standard which, in many cases, forecloses placement with [an]
Indian family." '44
The ICWA includes both procedural and substantive provi-
sions to forward its purpose. It includes a dual jurisdictional
scheme in which the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction "over any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such
jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal
law."45 Additionally, § 1911(b) provides that when an Indian child
is not domiciled on a reservation, "the court, in the absence of
good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the
jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent ...
[p]rovided, [t]hat such transfer shall be subject to declination by
the tribal court . . ."4 The U.S. Supreme Court has found
§ 1911(b) to create "concurrent but presumptively tribal jurisdic-
tion in the case of children not domiciled on the reservation. '" 47
The ICWA also provides, inter alia, that the child's tribe may
intervene "at any point" in proceedings involving foster care
42. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)-(5) (1994).
43. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 95-1386 at 23 (1978))
[hereinafter HoUSE REPORT]; see also, Adams, supra note 35, at 321 ("The legislative
history [of ICWA] reflects a concern for the welfare of tribes and Indian children who
grow up without a connection to their Indian culture.").
44. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37 (alteration in original) (quoting HOUSE REPORT at
24).
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
46. Idl § 1911(b). "Good Cause" was intended to be a modified form of forum non
conveniens. See In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187,
191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Ill. 1995).
47. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36.
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placement or termination of parental rights;4 that the tribe be
given notice "[i]n any involuntary proceeding in a State court,
where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child
is involved;, 49 and that evidence establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt "that the continued custody of the child by the parent or
Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child" before involuntary termination of parental
rights. 0 Additionally, the ICWA provides stringent requirements
for establishing voluntary termination of parental rights, including
the requirement that consent to termination be "executed in writ-
ing and recorded before a judge of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion and accompanied by the presiding judge's certificate that the
terms and consequences of the consent were fully explained in de-
tail and were fully understood.",
51
Finally, it provides that in any adoption placement under state
law, an Indian child be placed according to a set of preferences.
These preferences provide that the child be placed "with (1) a
member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the
Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families[,]" absent "good
cause to the contrary."' 2 The Supreme Court has found these
placement preferences "[t]he most important substantive require-
ment imposed on state courts."53 If any of the provisions of 25
U.S.C. §§ 1911, 1912, or 1913 are violated, 25 U.S.C. § 1914 pro-
vides that a tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction
to invalidate the action which violated the section. 4
II. THE TRUST RESPONSIBILITY THWARTED
A. The Existing Indian Family Exception
The Act specifically states that it applies to any child who is
either "(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for mem-
bership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member
of an Indian tribe."5 The only exceptions to applying the Act to
48. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
49. Id § 1912(a).
50. Id. § 1912(0.
51. Id- §1913(a).
52. Id. § 1915(a).
53. HolyfieldK, 490 U.S. at 36.
54. See 25 U.S.C. § 1914.
55. Id § 1903(4).
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such a child in a "custody proceeding" are "a placement based
upon an act which, if comitted by an adult, would be deemed a
crime or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one
of the parents."56 "If these prerequisites are met, ICWA supplies
procedural requirements and substantive standards that must be
used by the state court instead of procedures and standards under
state law." 7 However, some state courts have refused to apply the
Act where a child is not being removed from what they deem an
"existing Indian family."
This judicially created exception to the Act was first invoked
in In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.5 1 In that case the Kansas Su-
preme Court refused to apply the Act to an illegitimate child of a
non-Indian mother and an Indian father, when the child was vol-
untarily given up for adoption to non-Indian parents by the
mother, over the objection of the father and his American Indian
tribe. 9 The court reasoned that the intent of the Act was to pre-
vent "removal of Indian children from an existing Indian family
unit and the resultant breakup of the Indian family."60 The court
therefore found that the Act did not apply to "an illegitimate in-
fant who has never been a member of an Indian home or culture"
and "so long as the mother is alive to object, would probably never
become a part of the [father's] or any other Indian family. '
However, in one of the most recent cases to invoke the excep-
tion, In re Bridget R., the court faced a different scenario.62 In this
case the court refused to apply the Act to twin daughters of an
American Indian father who was a member of the Pomo tribe
63
56. Id. § 1903(1).
57. In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925,929 (Idaho 1993).
58. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
59. Baby Boy L. represents the most common scenario in which the exception has
been invoked: challenges by unwed Indian fathers, who are Tribal members, and their
tribes, to the adoption of their illegitimate children, born to non-Indian mothers.
Usually these children have never lived with the father or with any other Indian family,
and the mother wants the child placed with a non-Indian family. See, e.g., In re Adop-
tion of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985); Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650
(S.D. 1987); In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992); see generally Toni Hahn Davis,
The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D. L. REV.
465 (1993).
60. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
61. Id. at 175.
62. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (1996). The court stated that "[t]he
facts... are ... substantially undisputed." Id at 1492 n.3, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516 n.3.
63. The father is a member by virtue of his birth in 1972, at which time the tribe
recognized members "solely by custom and tradition, under which any lineal descen-
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and a mother who was of the Mexican Indian Yaqui tribe.6 At the
time the twins were born, the father was twenty-one and the
mother twenty.5 They were living together with their two other
children but were not married.6 When they learned of this third
pregnancy, they decided to give up the twins for adoption.
6 7
During the course of the proceedings, the father told the at-
torney handling the case of his Native American ancestry.6 The
attorney allegedly told the Indian father that recording his ances-
try would make adoption more difficult and urged him to remove
reference to his Native American ancestry.69 The Indian father
then revised the form and omitted reference to his Native Ameri-
can ancestry.0 The relinquishment documents listed the birth fa-
ther as "white" and specified that the twins would be relinquished
to an Ohio couple who intended to adopt them.7'
The twins were born in November, 1993.72 Approximately one
month after the twins' birth, in December, 1993, the Indian father
told his mother of their birth and of his relinquishment of them.73
In early February, 1994, she contacted the Pomo tribe about the
relinquishment, requesting intervention and applying for enroll-
ment in the tribe for herself, her son, and his twin daughters.7 4 She
told the tribe that she wished the twins placed within the extended
Indian family.75 She later explained to a reporter that "her whole
family and a tribe beyond, is prepared to receive the children with
love. 'I know the pain [the adoptive parents] feel [when faced with
the possibility of losing the children], because I felt the same pain
dant of a historic tribal member was automatically a member of the Tribe and was rec-
ognized as such from birth." IL at 1493, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516-17. The father and his
twin daughters were formally enrolled approximately four months after the twins' birth.
See id. at 1495, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
64. See id. at 1492,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
65. See id. at 1493, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517.
66. See id
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id
70. See id These facts were reported in greater detail locally during the trial below.
See James Rainey, Birth Parents to Get Twins, Judge Rules, L.A. TIMEs, June 15, 1995,
atAl.
71. See Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1494,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518. The California
court admits that "[i]t is undisputed that the relinquishments were not executed in the
manner required by ICWA." Id at 1491,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
72. See id at 1492,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
73. See id. at 1495,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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when I realized I had two granddaughters I didn't even know."'
76
Within a few weeks, in late February or early March, 1994, the
tribe contacted the attorney who had handled the case as well as
the Los Angeles County Children's Court, requesting intervention
in the proceedings and asking that the twins' father be allowed to
rescind his relinquishment.7 The agency handling the placement
refused, and the twins remained with the family seeking to adopt
them.7' This family formally filed to adopt on May 4, 1994.71
Given these facts, there seemed no question that the Act
applied because the twins were by then enrolled members of their
Indian tribe and had previously been eligible for membership as
biological children of a member of the tribe, as required by 25
U.S.C. § 1903(4). Additionally, the proceeding was not a divorce
or delinquency proceeding, the only Indian child custody proceed-
ings to which the ICWA is inapplicable."0 At the June, 1995, trial,
the judge blamed the entire proceeding on the attorney handling
the case. The judge reasoned that the attorney "'clearly failed in
terms of his responsibility to his clients .... Had he addressed
these issues in the initial interview, we would not all be here to-
day.'' '.. The judge therefore ordered the twins returned to their
birth parents.
The prospective adoptive parents appealed. 3 The California
Court of Appeal for the Second District, sua sponte, raised eleven
questions for the parties to address on appeal. Among them was
whether the ICWA applies "in the context of the 'Existing Indian
Family' where, as here, it appears that neither the children nor
their birth parents have a meaningful connection with Indian tribal
76. Rainey, supra note 70, at A36 (quoting paternal grandmother, Karen Adams).
77. See Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1495,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
78. See id at 1496,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
79. See iL at 1494, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518. The California appellate court pre-
sumed that at the time of its decision in January, 1996, this petition was still pending.
See id
80. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
81. Rainey, supra note 70, at A36 (quoting Judge John Henning). The bill recently
passed in the Senate, S. 1962, would impose criminal sanctions on anyone making
fraudulent misrepresentations about whether a child or parent is "Indian" for purposes
of the Act. S. 1962,104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 114 (1996).
82. See Rainey, supra note 70, at Al.
83. The adoptive parents also filed suit against the attorney who had advised the
Indian father against revealing his ancestry, alleging, inter alia, legal malpractice, breach
of fiduciary duty, actual and constructive fraud, and misrepresentation and conceal-
ment. See Verified Complaint for Damages, at 6, 12-34, Rost v. Cook, No. BC133935
(Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Aug. 22,1995).
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or family life and where their primary cultural heritage is other
than Indian. " 4
In its subsequent decision the court found the issue in the case
before it to be "whether the Act should be limited in its applica-
tion.., to children who not only are of Indian descent, but also
belong to an 'existing Indian family."'8 5 Although the California
Court of Appeal for the First District had thirteen years earlier
rejected the "judicial creation" of the existing Indian family ex-
ception as undermining a major purpose of the Act,86 the Second
District Court of Appeal found that
under the Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, ICWA does not and can-
not apply to invalidate a voluntary termination of paren-
tal rights respecting an Indian child who is not domiciled
on a reservation, unless the child's biological parent, or
parents, are not only of American Indian descent, but also
maintain a significant social, cultural or political relation-
ship with their tribef
The court then remanded the case to determine whether the
father's relationship with the tribe was "significant" enough to
apply the ICWA, even though the court observed that "the events
and circumstances... strongly suggest[] that no such relationship
existed."88 However, if the trial court were to find such a relation-
ship, the appellate court dictated that "it will be necessary to con-
duct a further hearing on the question of whether there should be
a change of custody," despite the tribe's "presumptive[] ... ju-
risdiction" over the matter.
B. Problems with the Existing Indian Family Exception
As the California Court of Appeal for the First District rec-
84. Unpublished Court Order at 1, In re Bridget R., No. 93520 (July 5, 1995) (on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
85. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1491,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
86. See In re Junious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d 786,796,193 Cal. Rptr. 40,46 (1983).
87. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1492,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
88. Id. at 1522,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536. The court posed the question on remand as
"whether [the Indian father], who, at all relevant times, resided several hundred miles
from the tribal reservation, ever participated in tribal life or maintained any significant
social, cultural or political relation with the Tribe." Id. at 1491, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515-
16.
89. I1d at 1522,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536.
90. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,36 (1989).
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ognized, however, the problem with the existing Indian family ex-
ception is that "[t]he language of the Act contains no such excep-
tion to its applicability, and [it is] not... appropriate to create one
judicially." Additionally, several courts have noted that Congress
considered and rejected proposed language which would have re-
stricted the application of the ICWA. "[W]hen a court ignores
the clear provisions.., in reliance on what the court believes the
legislature must have meant to say, the court is improperly engag-
ing in judicial lawmaking." 3 This is especially true in Indian cases
which, under the Indian Commerce Clause, are the "exclusive
province" of federal law.94
But even if the language of the Act or the legislative intent
behind it were not clear, the judicial creation of an exception to
the Act's applicability would violate the canons of construction of
federal Indian law. The United States Supreme Court has held
that "[i]n interpreting Indian treaties and statutes, '[d]oubtful ex-
pressions are to be resolved in favor of the.., people who are the
wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good
faith."' 95 Because the canons of construction of federal Indian laws
require them to be construed "'in a spirit which generously recog-
nizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests' of
the tribes,96 "statutes... dealing with Indian affairs have been con-
91. In re Junious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d 786, 796, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 46 (1983); see
also In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 953 (111. 1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting)
("There is no provision in the ICWA requiring that an Indian child be born into or be
living in an Indian family unit to be subject to its provisions. However much one might
believe the ICWA should have been written that way, '[n]o amount of probing into
what Congress 'intended' can alter what Congress said."'); In re N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96,
100 n.(unnumbered) (S.D. 1991) (Sabers, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) ("There is
simply no statutory requirement for [the child] to have been born into an Indian home
or an Indian community in order to come within the provisions of the ICWA, however
much one might believe 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) should have been written that way.").
92. See Nelson v. Hunter, 888 P.2d 124, 126 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (citing 6
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7538-39, 7558-63 (1978)) (Congress rejected language in ICWA
that would restrict application of the Act to enrolled members of the tribe); S.S., 657
N.E.2d at 951 (Congress rejected proposal that Indian children must have
"significant contacts" with the tribe in order to invoke tribal jurisdiction under the
ICWA); In re Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d 451, 454 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (lack of
contact with tribe rejected in Bureau of Indian Affairs [BIA] Guidelines as "good
cause not to transfer" proceedings to tribe).
93. N.S., 474 N.W.2d at 100 n.(unnumbered) (Sabers, J., concurring).
94. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
95. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,208 n.17 (1978).
96. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943) (quoting Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942)).
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strued liberally in favor of establishing Indian rights.""
Using this liberal construction, the Supreme Court in Holy-
field stated that
[w]e start, however, with the general assumption that "in
the absence of a plain indication to the contrary,... Con-
gress, when it enacts a statute is not making the applica-
tion of the federal act dependent on state law." One rea-
son for this rule of construction is that federal statutes are
generally intended to have uniform nationwide applica-
tion.... A second reason for the presumption against the
application of state law is the danger that "the federal
program would be impaired if state law were to control."
For this reason, "we look to the purpose of the statute to
ascertain what is intended."98
The Supreme Court found Congress's "purpose" apparent, reason-
ing that "[t]he numerous prerogatives accorded the tribes through
the ICWA[] ... must, accordingly, be seen as a means of protect-
ing not only the interests of individual Indian children and fami-
lies, but also of the tribes themselves."" The Supreme Court em-
braced evidence that showed that "[r]emoval of Indian children
from their cultural setting seriously impacts a long-term tribal sur-
vival and has damaging social and psychological impact on many
individual Indian children."' ° The Supreme Court therefore fo-
cused on Congress's intent to protect Indian children and tribes
from "cultural" removal rather than removal from what the indi-
vidual state courts might variously define as an existing Indian
family. Such a focus parallels Congress's intent "to ensure the
continued viability of Indian tribes by protecting Indian children
from cultural genocide,' 1 since "[t]he preservation of Indian soci-
ety and culture clearly involves Indian children ... [who] neces-
sarily sustain the culture of a people from one generation to the
next."'2 The Supreme Court therefore held that the Act applied
even to twins who had been placed with a non-Indian family at
97. COHEN, supra note 28, at 224. For example, the canons have been used to rec-
ognize the existence of reserved water rights and hunting and fishing rights, and to
make exemptions from the exercise of state taxing authority. See id.
98. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43-44 (1989)
(citations omitted).
99. Id. at49.
100. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
101. Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 162 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
102. Id. at 161.
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birth and had never been on the reservation or spent time with
their Indian family.' 3
Accordingly, in 1989, it became the "holding of the United
States Supreme Court that even without contact with the tribe or
reservation since their births, and even though [the] Indian parents
did not want tribal involvement.., the tribal court was the appro-
priate forum to determine the custody of children of members of
the tribe." ' The Supreme Court reasoned that
[t]ribal jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not meant to be
defeated by the actions of individual members of the
tribe, for Congress was concerned not solely about the in-
terests of Indian children and families, but also about the
impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of
Indian children adopted by non-Indians.' 5
Therefore, applying the existing Indian family exception violates
the clear intent of Congress expressed in the Act because
it posits as a determinative jurisdictional test the volun-
tariness of the conduct of the [parent(s)] .... [T]he Act
itself specifies procedures for voluntary terminations of
parental rights.... [T]he application of the ICWA to
voluntary... adoptions is not inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Act .... The effect on both the tribe and the
Indian child of the placement of the child in a non-Indian
setting is the same whether or not the placement was vol-
untary. '°6
The Bridget R. court, however, found it
particularly significant ... that in the months preceding
the birth of the twins, the biological parents turned.., to
California's legal process for the purpose of securing the
adoption of the twins .... The biological parents did this
voluntarily and for reasons which reflected that their pri-
mary concern was for the twins' future .... 207
The court found that the voluntary placement, coupled with
the Indian father's coerced denial of his Native American heritage,
"permits a very strong inference to be drawn about the absence of
103. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 53.
104. In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060,1068 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (citation omitted).
105. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49.
106. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 932 (NJ. 1988).
107. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1515, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 531-32
(1996).
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a significant relationship with the Tribe." ' The Supreme Court,
in Holyfield, however, anticipated just such a reaction by the state
courts. In concluding that Indian parents may not unilaterally de-
feat the jurisdictional scheme of the ICWA, the Supreme Court
reasoned that "[o]ne of the effects of our national paternalism has
been to so alienate some Indian [parents] from their society that
they abandon their children at hospitals or to welfare departments
rather than entrust them to the care of relatives in the extended
family." 1' 9
The United States Supreme Court's opinion makes it clear,
then, that the Act is not limited to children taken from an existing
Indian family and that "Indian tribes still ha[ve] a legitimate inter-
est in the welfare of members who [do] not have previous signifi-
cant contact with the tribe or the reservation."'110 By the terms of
the Act itself,' "[o]nly when a parent is not available and the child
is over five years of age should a state court intervene and make a
determination involving lack of contact with the tribe.""
2
The application of the judicial existing Indian family excep-
tion thus ignores Congress's admonition, codified in 25 U.S.C. §
1901(5), that "the States... have often failed to recognize the es-
sential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families."13  In
fact, the United States Supreme Court noted that "the States and
their courts... [are] partly responsible for the problem [Congress,
through the ICWA] intended to correct.""14 This is because state
courts often do not understand the cultural and social standards in-
forming Indian family life"5 that underlie the Act's "fundamental
assumption that it is in the Indian child's best interest that its rela-
tionship to the tribe be protected.""' 6 In addition, studies pre-
108. Id- at 1515, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 532 (emphasis omitted).
109. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 51 n.25.
110. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at i71.
111. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994).
112. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 171.
113. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5).
114. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5)).
115. See Christine Metteer, Pigs in Heaven: A Parable of Native American Adoption
Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 28 ARIz. ST. LJ. 589, 613-18 (1996) (focusing on
the Indian concept of family as "a notion as fluid as river." Id. at 618).
116. Holyfield, 400 U.S. at 50 n.24 (approving In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile
Action S-903, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)). Virtually all courts refusing to
invoke the existing Indian family exception follow Pima. See, e.g., Junious M., 144 Cal.
App. 3d at 786, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 40; and its post-Holyfield progeny in California, In re
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sented in the congressional hearings on the Act showed "recurring
developmental problems encountered during adolescence by In-
dian children raised in a white environment.... depriving the child
of his or her tribal and cultural heritage.
1 17
State courts applying the existing Indian family exception,
however, do not understand that
the phrase "best interests of Indian children" in the con-
text of the ICWA is different than the general Anglo-
American "best interest of the child" standard... involv-
ing non-Indian children. Under the ICWA, what is best
for an Indian child is to maintain ties with the Indian
Tribe, culture, and family. By using the best interest of
the child standard employed by state courts in cases in-
volving non-Indian children, the.., court engage[s] in the
type of analysis that created the need for the Act in the
first place."'
In this type of analysis, the "underlying assumption is that relying
on Indian determination... would not truly result in what is best
for the Indian child .... [T]his [is] an arrogant idea that defeats
the sovereignty of Indian tribes in custody matters; the very idea
for which the ICWA was enacted."'1 9 In fact, the United States
Supreme Court found the state courts' "overly paternalistic ap-
proach [in Indian matters] ... both exploitative and destructive"
and therefore "determined that proper fulfillment of its trust
[responsibility] required turning over to the Indians a greater con-
trol of their own destinies." 2 '
Based on the interpretation of the ICWA by the Supreme
Kahlen W, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1414, 285 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1991); In re Lindsay C., 229 Cal.
App. 3d 404, 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1991); In re Crystal K., 226 Cal. App. 3d 655, 665, 276
Cal. Rptr. 619, 625 (1990) ("Pima stated the purpose of the Act was to establish mini-
mum federal standards... to prevent the separation of Indian children from their fam-
ily, tribal and cultural heritage."); see also, Barbara Ann Atwood, Fighting Over Indian
Children: The Uses and Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 16 UCLA L. REV. 1051,
1062 (1989) ("The Act clearly rests on the congressional belief that the best interests of
Indian children would be served by protecting the tribal role.").
117. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 50 n.24 (citations omitted).
118. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 169 (citations omitted).
119. Ia at 170; see also In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1319 (Mont. 1981) (Sheehy, J.,
dissenting) ("[We cannot] refuse transfer of the proceedings to a tribal court on the
perception that the tribal court may not act with respect to the child in the way we
would wish it to act. The purpose of the Indian Child Welfare Act is to remove as far as
possible the white man's perceptions in these matters where Indian values may con-
flict.").
120. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,553 (1974).
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Court in Holyfield, many states have re-evaluated their prior use
of the existing Indian family exception, or refused to invoke it for
the first time. Oklahoma recently passed legislation calling for
state courts to "recognize that Indian tribes and nations have a
valid governmental interest in Indian children regardless of
whether or not said children are in the physical or legal custody of
an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings
are initiated. 12' Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme Court in-
validated its previous holding in Claymore v. Serr, in which it had
invoked the existing Indian family exception, stating,
it is incorrect, when assessing ICWA's applicability to a
particular case, to focus only upon the interests of an ex-
isting [Indian] family. Such a practice fails to recognize
the legitimate concerns of the tribe that are protected un-
der the Act .... "Holyfield also carries the clear message
that [ICWA] would be read liberally, perhaps creatively,
to protect the rights of the tribe even against the clearly
expressed wishes of the parents."'1
The court in Bridget R., however, ignored this line of reasoning
and instead relied on the reasoning of Baby Boy L. and Claymore
as authority for its holding."2
The court's refusal to follow the post-Holyfield cases is espe-
cially perplexing, given the facts of the case.' 4 In Bridget R., both
parents are ethnically "Indian," the father and paternal grand-
mother lifetime members-and now enrolled members, as are the
twins-of a federally recognized American Indian tribe.12 Both
parents and the paternal grandmother want the children returned
121. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 40.1 (West Supp. 1995). This piece of legislation
may have the effect of invalidating the cases invoking the existing Indian family excep-
tion. See, e.g., In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D.,
742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
122. In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485,489-90 (S.D. 1990) (citation omitted)
(quoting Roger A. Tellinghuisen, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Practical
Guide with [Limited] Commentary, 34 S.D. L. Rlv. 660, 666 (1989)) (invalidating
Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987)); see also In re Baby Girl Doe, 865 P.2d
1090, 1095 (Mont. 1993) (stating that "[ilt is clear from the legislative findings and ex-
pression of policy, and the U.S. Supreme Court's application of the ICWA... that the
principle purposes of the Act are to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
by preventing further loss of their children; and to protect the best interests of Indian
children by retaining their connection to their tribes").
123. See Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1498,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520.
124. See supra notes 63-89 and accompanying text.
125. See Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1493-95,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517-18.
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to them to join their two siblings and to be raised within the fa-
ther's extended family.'2 The twins' tribe, the Dry Creek
Rancheria of Pomo Indians, joined their Indian family in the
suit.' 7 Additionally, the Oglala Sioux Tribe filed an amicus brief
in the case, which was joined by six other American Indian tribes,
nineteen Alaskan Native villages, and one California Indian Or-
ganization which includes seven other tribes.'2 These tribes felt
compelled to address the court because "some of amici's Indian
children were, are, and may be located in California. Some of
these children are involved in custody proceedings. The decision
in this case may determine the outcome of those proceedings.', 9
Thus, both the twins' parents, their paternal grandmother, their
tribe, and a host of other Native American tribes argued for the re-
turn of the twins to their Indian family.
This fact scenario is quite unlike that of Baby Boy L., or a
case factually similar to it, In re Crews, which the California court
relied upon. In those cases the courts noted that even if the ICWA
were applied, the Indian children would not be placed with their
Indian families anyway.' In fact, the Washington appellate court
in In re M. John Doe did not apply the exception because it found
Crews distinguishable on this fact.' Similarly, Bridget R. should
be distinguishable because the family and tribe seek to have the
children returned to their Indian family.
The California Court of Appeal for the Second District's de-
cision in Bridget R. is also perplexing since the California Court of
Appeal for the First District recently rejected the exception, even
when the non-Indian mother opposed tribal intervention.3 2 The
Lindsay C. court found the Act applicable despite the fact that the
child had never resided with the Indian father or been exposed to
Indian culture. The court reasoned that "[a]fter the decision in
Holyfield, it appears that the Kansas court in Baby Boy L. may
126. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
127. See Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1491, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
128. See Brief Amici Curaie of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, et al, in Support of Inter-
venors and Respondents Dry Creek Rancheria at 1, In re Bridget R., No. B093694
(Cal. Ct. App. filed Aug. 28,1995).
129. Il
130. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168,175 (Kan. 1982); In re Adop-
tion of Crews, 825 P.2d 305,310 (Wash. 1992).
131. See In re M. John Doe, 832 P.2d 518,521-22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
132. See In re Adoption of Lindsay C., 229 Cal. App. 3d 404, 280 Cal. Rptr. 194
(1991).
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have given inappropriate weight to the wishes of the family." '133
The court reasoned that the Act applied because the case did not
fall within the Act's two specific exceptions, divorce or delin-
quency proceedings,13 and because
applying the Act... advances the stated purposes of the
legislation-i.e. "to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of In-
dian tribes and families ...." Additionally, it is in keeping
with the tenor of Holyfield which stresses consideration of
not only the wishes of the parents, but the well-being and
interests of the child and the tribe.
1 15
In contrast, although agreeing that Holyfield had "explicitly
rejected" limiting application of the ICWA to children who had
themselves lived on a reservation, the Bridget R. court reasoned "it
does not follow from Holyfield that ICWA should apply when nei-
ther the child nor either natural parent has ever resided or been
domiciled on a reservation or maintained any significant social,
cultural or political relationship with an Indian tribe." '136 Thus,
even though the Indian father, the extended paternal family, and
the tribe sought the return of the twins to be raised by the immedi-
ate Indian family and exposed to the tribe and Indian culture, the
Second District Court of Appeal specifically concluded that absent
the state court's determination that the parents have significant
ties with a tribe, application of the Act
runs afoul of the Constitution in three ways: (1) it im-
permissibly intrudes upon a power ordinarily reserved to
the states, (2) it improperly interferes with Indian chil-
dren's fundamental due process rights respecting family
relationships; and (3) on the sole basis of race, it deprives
them of equal opportunities to be adopted that are avail-
able to non-Indian children and exposes them, like the
twin girls in this case, to having an existing non-Indian
family torn apart through an after the fact assertion of
tribal and Indian-parent rights under the ICWA ... .1 37
133. Id. at 412,280 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (citation omitted).
134. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
135. Lindsay C., 229 Cal. App. 3d at 415,280 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (citation omitted).
136. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1501,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522.
137. Ia at 1511-12,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF APPLYING THE ICWA
REGARDLESS OF SOCIAL, CULTURAL, OR POLITICAL TIES TO THE
TRIBE OF AN INDIAN CHILD OR THE CHILD'S PARENTS
The California court's use of the existing Indian family excep-
tion to challenge, not only the Act's applicability, but its constitu-
tionality, is unprecedented."' However, a review of the United
States Supreme Court's decisions reviewing Congress's broad ple-
nary power to regulate Indian affairs shows that "[l]egislation with
respect to these 'unique aggregations' has repeatedly been sus-
tained."'39
The Supreme Court's refusal to overturn any congressional
legislation regarding Indians first suggests that although the Cali-
fornia court and other critics of the ICWA have argued that "the
law might be subject to a reserved power of the states or Tenth
Amendment challenge .. .in light of the reluctance of the Su-
preme Court ... to enforce limits on the powers of the federal
government vis-A-vis the states, one should not assume this to be
the case."' 40 Secondly, Congress's power to enact legislation con-
cerning Indian affairs, which often implicates the same due process
or equal protection concerns addressed by the Bridget R. court, has
been upheld by the High Court because "[a]s separate sovereigns
pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been re-
garded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed
specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.' 14' As early
as 1896 the Supreme Court held that "the Fifth Amendment did
not 'operat[e] upon' 'the powers of local self-government enjoyed'
138. One attorney in the case found the California court's challenge an "attack on
the Indian Child Welfare Act" itself. James Rainey, Court Blocks Return of Adopted
Twin Girls, L.A. TIMEs, July 7, 1995, at B1 (quoting Indian twins' mother's attorney,
Gerald Klausner).
139. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977) (citing as examples Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) and Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976)). In a
comprehensive study of Supreme Court decisions, one author observed "only a single
Supreme Court case [In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905)] overturned an act of Congress
regulating Indian affairs on anything resembling equal protection [or due process]
grounds, and the Court overruled that case just eleven years later" in United States v.
Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916). John Robert Renner, The Indian Child Welfare Act and
Equal Protection Limitations on the Federal Power over Indian Affairs, 17 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 129, 146 (1992).
140. Renner, supra note 139, at 150.
141. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,56 (1978).
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by the tribes."1 42 And in 1978 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized,
in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, that "[i]n ensuing years the
lower federal courts have extended the holding of Talton to other
provisions of the Bill of Rights, as well as to the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 43
After Talton, federal courts of appeal that upheld equal pro-
tection or due process rights against Indian tribes "qualified their
holdings by stating that no distinctly Indian tradition or cultural
norm justified" exempting tribes from the applicable constitutional
provisions in the action under review.'" In these cases the courts
"correctly sensed that Congress did not intend that the equal pro-
tection and due process principles of the Constitution disrupt set-
tled tribal customs and traditions."' 45 Therefore, since Congress
certainly intended to protect "settled tribal customs and tradi-
tions" when it enacted the ICWA to preserve the continued exis-
tence of the tribes by preventing their "cultural genocide,"' no
equal protection or due process principles are implicated.
A. The Indian Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment
In Bridget R. the California Court of Appeal questioned
whether Congress exceeded its authority under Article I, section 8,
clause 3, of the Constitution when it legislates on behalf of Indian
tribes, children, and families when the Indian children's parents
"are of Indian descent, but... maintain no significant social, cul-
tural or political relationships with Indian community life."' 47
However, Congress's powers are extremely broad'4 and extend to
defining tribal existence and membership,' 0 as well as to defining
who is an Indian for purposes of determining applicability of fed-
eral legislation.15' Significantly, in 1978 the United States Supreme
142. Id. (quoting Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376,384 (1896)).
143. I& (footnote omitted). The court noted specifically the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and freedom of religion under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
144. See COHEN, supra note 28, at 670 (footnote omitted).
145. Id. (footnote omitted).
146. Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 162 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
147. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483,1511,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507,529 (1996).
148. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
149. See Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
150. See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407 (1865).
151. Congress variously defines "Indian" in different statutes. See, e.g., the defini-
tion of "Indian" and "Indian child" in the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3)-(4); see also
COHEN, supra note 28, at 23 (containing a full treatment of Congress's statutory defini-
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Court found, in United States v. John, that the Federal Crimes Act
applied to an offense comitted in an area designated a reservation
for the Choctaw Indians and precluded state prosecution of the
same offense. 52
The state of Mississippi argued that the Choctaw Indians re-
siding in Mississippi had been "fully assimilated into the political
and social life of the State" since 1830, and the "Federal Govern-
ment long ago abandoned its supervisory authority over these In-
dians."'53 The State therefore reasoned that "the power given
Congress '[t]o regulate Commerce ...with the Indian Tribes,'
Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 3, cannot provide a basis for federal jurisdic-
tion."1 54
The United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the
State's argument that Congress exceeded its enumerated powers if
the Major Crimes Act's definitions of Indians and Indian lands
were applied to "assimilated" Indians. The Court stated:
we do not agree that Congress and the Executive Branch
have less power to deal with the affairs of the Mississippi
Choctaws than with the affairs of other [non-assimilated]
Indian groups. Neither the fact that the Choctaws in
Mississippi are merely a remnant of a larger group of In-
dians, long ago removed from Mississippi, nor the fact
that federal supervision of them has not been continuous,
destroys the federal power to deal with them.'55
However, like the Mississippi state court which argued that
the "political and social life"' 56 of the subject Indians determined
whether the federal government could exercise its power, the Cali-
fornia court found no federal interests in applying the ICWA to
Indian children whose parents had no "significant social, cultural
or political relationship with the Tribe."' The court reasoned that
the ICWA's purpose is not furthered when the Act is applied to
families when the "parents... have become fully assimilated into
non-Indian culture."' 58 The court therefore challenged the Act's
constitutionality under the Tenth Amendment, concluding that
tions of "Indians").
152. See 437 U.S. 634, 654 (1978).
153. Id at 652.
154. Id.
155. Id at 652-53 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
156. Id at 652.
157. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1491,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
158. Id at 1507,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
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Congress exceeds its authority when, acting under any of
its enumerated powers, Congress legislates in matters
generally within the jurisdiction of the states, in the ab-
sence of an adequate nexus to the enumerated power un-
der which the legislation is enacted.
No such nexus exists respecting application of ICWA
to children whose families... are in all respects indistin-
guishable from other residents of the state.5
The United States Supreme Court in John, however, found an
"adequate nexus" in the "elaborate history ... of relations be-
tween the [Indian tribes] and the United States."1" This history
included the fact that "[iln the early 1950's... federal Indian pol-
icy.., emphasized assimilation"'' rather than self-government. 2
Similarly, an adequate nexus can be found in the ICWA's provi-
sions, which were "deemed by Congress to be essential for the pro-
tection of Indian culture and to assure the very existence of Indian
tribes.""' Congress's review of the elaborate history of Indian
child custody abuse 16 led to its finding, codified in the ICWA, that
"there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence
and integrity of Indian tribes than their children."
' 6
The federal interest in preserving the very existence of the
tribes by preventing the cultural removal of their children is there-
fore "clear and substantial,' and allowing state courts to reject
application of the Act based on the Indian family's lack of "social,
cultural, or political" ties to the tribe would do "major damage" to
such interest. In fact, "... Congress was concerned with the rights
of Indian families and Indian communities vis-a-vis state authori-
ties." 67 Therefore, under a valid exercise of its power to regulate
Indian affairs under Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United
States Constitution, "the public policy of th[e] State is subservient
to Acts of Congress including the ICWA ... [and] [i]t is incum-
159. IM. at 1511, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529 (citation omitted).
160. John, 437 U.S. at 652.
161. Id. at 653 n.24.
162. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
163. In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060,1068 (M. App. Ct. 1990).
164. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,32-35 (1989).
165. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
166. The court in Bridget R. determined that if the ICWA were to override state law
in an adoption case, it would have to be shown that "application of the state law would
do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial federal interests."' Bridget R., 41 Cal. App.
4th at 1510,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 528 (citation omitted).
167. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45.
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bent upon the [state] court to provide all... protections."' l
B. Due Process Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
In Bridget R. the California court also addressed the question
of "whether the tribal interests which ICWA protects are suffi-
ciently compelling under substantive due process standards to jus-
tify the impact which ICWA's requirements will have on [Indian
children's] constitutionally protected familial rights" 169 when those
children are not from an existing Indian family. The court rea-
soned that these special rights and protections would not apply
unless, when applied, they served a "compelling government pur-
pose.., actually necessary and effective to the accomplishment of
[Congress's] purpose."'"7 If they do not, the court reasoned, Indian
children would be deprived of the due process of law protecting
their rights under the Constitution. 171 The court then found that
the Act's purpose of protecting
"the unique values of Indian culture" (25 U.S.C. § 1902)
will not be preserved in the homes of parents who have
become fully assimilated into non-Indian culture ....
[especially] where fully assimilated Indian parents ...
have previously concluded a reasoned and voluntary re-
linquishment of a child, which was valid and has become
final under state law, and the child has become part of an
adoptive or prospective adoptive family.
172
The court's analysis of the question, however, centered
around the fundamental liberty interests afforded all parents and
children by both the United States Constitution and California
law, 73 rather than on the special liberty interests created by Con-
gress for Indian children, parents, and tribes in the ICWA.1" The
168. In re J.W., 742 P.2d 1171,1175 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
169. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1507,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
170. Id. (citation omitted).
171. See id. The court, through labored analysis, found that the Indian parents had
no constitutional rights to the children they had voluntarily relinquished under state
law, or at least they had "voluntar[ily] subordinat[ed]" those rights. Id. Similarly, the
court found that the tribe had no rights protected under the Constitution. See id. at
1508,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527. Thus, the court concluded that the only party with consti-
tutional rights was "the twins... [who] have a presently existing fundamental and con-
stitutionally protected interest in their relationship with the only family they have ever
known." Id at 1507,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1501-07,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522-26.
174. The United States Supreme Court has determined that "[t]he numerous pre-
[Vol. 30:647
EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION
California Court of Appeal, in so reasoning, engaged in analysis in
which, in the words of the trial judge in the case, "[t]he ingredient
that was left out.., was the interests of the tribe."'175
The substantive provisions of the ICWA provide Indians with
rights beyond those constitutionally afforded to all other American
families, 76 which carry their own due process requirements-the
procedural provisions of the Act. The liberty interest of the tribes,
which "is at the core of the ICWA"'" and is protected by it, is the
right of a tribe as a sovereign nation to retain "its children in its
society.', 7' As a sovereign it is "concerned with the welfare of all
who are tribal members or who are eligible to be tribal members
and who are not yet of an age to choose." 79 Because Congress was
interested in protecting the tribes' interest vis-h-vis their children,
not vis-A-vis these children's possibly assimilated parents,8 ' "under
the ICWA, even in instances where there is a total lack of contact
with a child, an Indian tribe has a very real and substantive interest
in each child.,
1 8'
The special rights and protections of the ICWA therefore con-
stitute a liberty interest in retaining Indian culture, which has been
found to be a civil right.lu It is a right specially conferred by fed-
eral statute because of the emerging federal policy against the past
policy of assimilation"' and towards Indian "self-determination"
and "self-government."1 ' The ICWA enables tribes to achieve the
federal goals of self-determination and self-government by protect-
ing the "resource ... [most] vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes"'"-their member children and children
rogatives accorded the tribes through the ICWA's substantive provisions.., must...
be seen as a means of protecting not only the interests of individual Indian children and
families, but also of the tribes themselves." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,49 (1989).
175. Rainey, supra note 70, at A36 (quoting Los Angeles Superior Court Judge John
Henning.)
176. For an explanation of the constitutionality of these provisions under the equal
protection clause, see infra notes 246-59 and accompanying text.
177. In re Halloway, 732 P.2d 962,969 (Utah 1986).
178. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37 (citation omitted).
179. Adams, supra note 35, at 323.
180. I am indebted to Ms. Carol Abernathy for determining this focus of the ICWA
and for pointing out the California court's inversion of this principle.
181. In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1069 (Il. App. Ct. 1990) (citing Holyfield, 490
U.S. at 30).
182. CoHEN, supra note 28, at 662.
183. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634,653 n.24 (1978).
184. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
185. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49.
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eligible for membership. These children, regardless and perhaps
because of their parents' present lack of a significant relationship
with the tribe, are "the only real means for the transmission of the
tribal heritage.... [When] denied exposure to the ways of their
People... these practices seriously undercut the tribes' ability to
continue as self-governing communities.'
18 6
In order to protect these substantive interests, the ICWA also
provides procedural safeguards. The procedural protections "[a]t
the heart of the ICWA are its provisions concerning jurisdiction
over Indian child custody proceedings."' Additionally, the Act
provides that a tribe "shall have a right to intervene at any point in
the [Indian child custody] proceeding.""' Finally, the Act provides
that notice be given to the tribe "[i]n any involuntary proceeding
in a State court" involving an Indian child."8 9 And, since "the
tribe's right to assert jurisdiction over the proceeding or to inter-
vene in it is meaningless if the tribe has no notice that the action is
pending[,]' such notice presumably extends to voluntary pro-
ceedings as well.' Because of the importance of notice to a tribe
in order for it to intervene and/or eventually exercise jurisdiction,
"[c]ourts have consistently held [that] failure to provide the re-
quired notice requires remand."'1
Thus, because of its "broad remedial purposes,"'' the ICWA
"creates a higher burden [in removing an Indian child from his or
her Indian family or culture] than that imposed by State law."'1
94
This higher burden of protecting the Indian child's cultural rights
applies because "[t]he determination of a child's best interests un-
der the Act clearly differs from the analysis required by state law
when a parent who has consented to an adoption seeks to regain
custody."'9 5 Accordingly, the ICWA has been used to revoke in-
voluntary termination of parental rights accomplished under state
186. Id at 34 (quoting S. 1214 Hearings, supra note 35 (statement of Calvin Issac)).
187. Id. at 36; see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)-(b) (1994).
188. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
189. Id § 1912(a).
190. In re Junious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d 786,790-91,193 Cal. Rptr. 40,42 (1983).
191. See Catholic Soc. Serv. Inc. v. C.A.A., 783 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Alaska 1989)
(Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
192. In re Kahlen W., 233 Cal. App. 3d 1414,1424,285 Cal. Rptr. 507,513 (1991).
193. Angus v. Joseph, 655 P.2d 208, 211 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); see supra notes 38-44
and accompanying text.
194. In re J.W., 742 P.2d 1171,1175 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
195. A.B.M. v. M.H. & A.H., 651 P.2d 1170,1175 (Alaska 1982).
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law,'6 as well as to grant a petition by Indian parents to reopen a
case when the Indian parents had initially consented to termina-
tion of their parental rights under state law.1 7 In fact, one court
has found that under the ICWA "prospective adoptive parents
must be held to assume the risk that [the Indian] parent... might
change [his or] her mind [about relinquishing his or her rights] be-
fore the adoption is finalized." '98 Finally, the ICWA has been in-
voked to procure a hearing and the appointment of counsel in an
Indian child custody action.'" If a state court refuses to take on
the "higher burden" set upon it by the ICWA it "defeat[s] one of
the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act-that of granting
due process to those involved in the process."
In the ICWA, then, Congress identified "two important, and
sometimes independent, policies[:] ... the interests of the Indian
child... [and] the stability and security of Indian tribes and fami-
lies."2°' The Bridget R. court, however, reasoned that
[t]hese two elements of ICWA's underlying policy are in
harmony in the circumstance in which ICWA was pri-
marily intended to apply-where nontribal, public and
private agencies act to remove Indian children from their
homes and place them in non-Indian homes or institu-
tions. But in cases such as this one, where, owing to non-
compliance with ICWA's procedural requirements,
ICWA's remedial provisions are invoked to remove chil-
dren from adoptive families to whom the children were
voluntarily given by the biological parents, the harmony is
bound to be strained... [especially where] the interests of
the tribe and the biological family may be in direct con-
flict with the children's strong needs, which we find to be
constitutionally protected, to remain through their devel-
oping years in one stable and loving home.
The court therefore found no "compelling government pur-
196. See id.
197. See Angus, 655 P.2d at 211; see also In re Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-
903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that 25 U.S.C. § 1913 provides a
"higher standard" of protection to Indian parents in termination proceedings).
198. Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d at 192.
199. See In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313,1317 (Mont. 1981).
200. In re G.L.O.C., 668 P.2d 235,237-38 (Mont. 1983).
201. Kahlen W., 233 Cal. App. 3d at 1421,285 Cal. Rptr. at 511 (citations omitted).
202. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1502, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522-23 (citation omit-
ted).
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pose" in applying the Act in situations where these competing in-
terests would violate the children's interest in staying with their
prospective adoptive family.23 In so reasoning, the court either de-
termined that the children's "constitutionally protected" interests
in staying in their adoptive home outweighed their interests in re-
taining their cultural heritage as protected by the Act, or that, un-
der the ICWA, the children's interests were superior to the inter-
ests of both the Indian parent[s] and tribe. Both assumptions are
incorrect.
First, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has never decided
whether a child has a liberty interest.., in maintaining his current
relationship [with a foster family]., 2  Although the Supreme
Court refused to decide whether a child had a liberty interest in
remaining with a foster family, it did make clear that any such in-
terest on the part of the child was "substantially attenuated absent
a finding of unfitness." 25 Therefore, cases attempting to assert
such rights on behalf of children have not met with success.2 6
Additionally, even if the children had such a constitutionally
protected right, "the Fifth Amendment [does] not 'operat[e] upon'
'the powers of local self government enjoyed' by the tribes[,]
20
and tribal rights have consistently been held to take precedence
over those of individual tribal members. In In re Adoption of
Halloway, a case heavily relied upon by the Supreme Court in
Holyfield, the Utah Supreme Court refused to allow a mother to
facilitate a non-Indian placement when she wished to avoid having
the child raised in an Indian environment.0 8 The court found that
such an action would "conflict[ with and undermine[] the opera-
tive scheme established by subsections 101(a) and 103(a) ... and
weakens considerably the tribe's ability to assert its interest in its
children[,]" which Congress intended to protect.2°9 In fact, "[t]he
effect on both the tribe and the Indian child of the placement of
the child in a non-Indian setting is the same whether or not the
203. See id at 1507,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
204. In re Otakar Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 339 (Ill. 1995) (citation omitted); see
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 847
(1977).
205. Otakar Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 339 (citing Smith, 431 U.S. at 846-47).
206. See, e.g., id.; In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649,668 (Mich. 1993).
207. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (quoting Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376,384 (1896)).
208. See Halloway, 732 P.2d at 969.
209. Id.
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placement [is] voluntary., 210
Citing Halloway with approval, the United States Supreme
Court later articulated the priority of the Act's competing inter-
ests. It found that Congress intended to subject placements out-
side Indian culture "to the ICWA's jurisdictional and other provi-
sions, even in cases where the parents consented to an adoption,
because of concerns going beyond the wishes of individual par-
ents., 211 The congressional "concern" that justified prioritizing the
tribes' rights over the parents' was the "'[r]emoval of Indian chil-
dren from their cultural setting [which] seriously impacts a long-
term tribal survival and has damaging social and psychological im-
pact on many individual Indian children.'
21 2
Following the reasoning of Holyfield, other state courts have
similarly prioritized the rights and interests protected under the
ICWA. The Montana Supreme Court held that the tribe's right to
enforce statutory preferences and place an Indian child with a
member of her Indian family took precedence over the mother's
wish for anonymity.23 And the California Court of Appeal for the
Fifth District upheld not only the tribe's right to the society of its
children, but an Indian child's right "not to be separated from the
tribe[,]" despite the Indian mother's failure to comply with the
provisions of the Act and provide proof of the child's member-
ship.214 It is therefore clear that after the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement in Holyfield, "the interests of the Tribe now are su-,,215
perior to the interests of the parents. 
Although the Montana justice quoted above found such prior-
ity "incredible, 2t6 it is completely within the framework that the
United States Supreme Court has established for interpreting fed-
eral Indian legislation. Since Talton v. Mayes the Supreme Court
has "repeatedly affirmed that the Constitution does not restrain
the exercise of tribal sovereignty in Indian country. '217 In United
210. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1988).
211. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 50.
212. Id (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-597, at 52 (1977)).
213. In re Baby Girl Doe, 865 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Mont. 1993) ("While a parent's wish
for anonymity can be considered where not otherwise in conflict with the Act's princi-
ple purposes, it cannot be allowed to defeat the purposes for which this Act was cre-
ated.").
214. Kahlen W., 233 Cal. App. 3d at 1425,285 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
215. In re Parental Placement of M.R.D.B., 787 P.2d 1219, 1225 (Mont. 1990)
(Weber, J., concurring).
216. IL
217. Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 687 F. Supp. 1380,1392 (D.
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States v. Wheeler, for example, the Supreme Court found that an
Indian tribe was an "independent sovereign," and "since tribal and
federal prosecutions are brought by separate sovereigns, they are
not 'for the same offense' and the Double Jeopardy Clause thus
does not bar one when the other has occurred. 2  The court there-
fore upheld an Indian tribal member's conviction in federal court
for rape despite having been tried in a tribal court on charges
stemming for the same incident.219 Thus, the tribal right as a sov-
ereign to separately try its member took precedence over the
member's constitutional protection against being subjected to
double jeopardy.
Even more pointedly, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez the
Supreme Court held that despite Congress's enactment of the In-
dian Civil Rights Act,20 in which Congress imposed "restrictions
upon tribal governments similar, but not identical, to those con-
tained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment[,]"''
the federal relief granted by the Indian Civil Rights Act to indi-
vidual tribal members against the tribe was limited to habeas cor-
pus.2 The Court found that " ... Congress's failure to provide
[specific] remedies other than habeas corpus was a deliberate
one '' mZ because "[t]wo distinct and competing purposes [of Con-
gress] are manifest in the provisions of the ICRA:... [not only] its
objective of strengthening the position of individual tribal mem-
bers vis-a-vis the tribe ... [but also] Congress['s] . . . inten[t] to
promote the well-established federal 'policy of furthering Indian
self-government."' ' 4
Thus, the Court upheld a tribe's right to deny membership to
children of female members who married outside of the tribe, in
the face of respondents' claim that such denial discriminated on
the basis of sex and race, in violation of Title I of the ICRA, which
extended equal protection rights to Indians.22 Though the ICRA
expressly granted neither the tribal right of determining its mem-
bership nor the individual member's right to equal protection un-
Alaska 1988).
21& 435 U.S. 313,313-14 (1978).
219. See id. at 329-30.
220. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
221. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 57.
222. See id. at 58.
223. Id. at 61.
224. Id at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
225. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341.
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der the federal law, the Court determined that "[w]here Congress
seeks to promote dual objectives in a single statute, courts must be
more than usually hesitant to infer from its silence a cause of ac-
tion that, while serving one legislative purpose, will disserve the
other."22 The Court gave tribal rights priority over those of indi-
vidual tribal members and held that the "[c]reation of a federal
cause of action for the enforcement of rights created in Title I...
plainly would be at odds with the congressional goal of protecting
tribal self-government." '
Such reasoning is directly applicable to a due process attack
against applying the ICWA to children a state court deems are not
being removed from an existing Indian family. The ICWA clearly
has "dual objectives": "to protect the best interests of Indian chil-
dren and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families[,]" although Congress did not specify which of these
objectives was to take precedence if in competition. However,
creating a state cause of action to protect any right Indian children
might have to remain in the non-Indian home in which they have
been placed would "plainly... be at odds with the congressional
goal of protecting tribal self-government[]", 9  and self-
determination by retaining their most vital resources-their mem-
ber children and children who are eligible for membership2 0 In
such circumstances the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Holyfield, Martinez, and Wheeler make clear that the protected
rights and interests of the tribes are at the heart of federal Indian
legislation and will take precedence over those of an individual
Indian member, even if otherwise constitutionally guaranteed.
In Bridget R., then, the children's right to stay with the family
with whom they were placed at birth has never been established as
a constitutional right and has never been given serious considera-
tion as one absent proof of unfitness,21 which has not been estab-
lished in this case. The children therefore have not been denied
any constitutional right to due process of law if the ICWA is ap-
plied, even if the state court determines that they were not re-
226. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 64; see also Mancari, 417 U.S. at 549-50 (congressional
silence in an amendment to an earlier statute conferring hiring preferences upon Indi-
ans held not to repeal that preference by implication).
227. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 64.
228. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
229. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 64.
230. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
231. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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moved from an existing Indian family. Nor have their due process
rights under the ICWA been denied. First, the congressional pre-
sumption underlying the Act is that preserving the cultural heri-
tage of an Indian child is in that child's best interest . Even if a
state court were to disagree with that assessment, the United
States Supreme Court has found that cultural heritage and tribal
existence must sometimes be achieved even at the expense of
some rights of individual members of the tribe that may be other-
wise constitutionally protected 3' Therefore, the children are not
denied due process by applying the Act and allowing the tribe to
determine placement according to its preferences, and the ICWA
must be applied regardless of whether or not a state court finds
that the Indian children at issue have been removed from an exist-
ing Indian family.
Additionally, since the "compelling government purpose" of
the Act is to protect tribal self-governance, self-determination, and
the very existence of the tribes themselves, the application of the
Act to preserve Indian tribes and children from "cultural geno-
cide" is "absolutely necessary ... to the accomplishment of
[Congress's] purpose." 35  It would therefore survive the strict
scrutiny standard which the California court found necessary if
application of the Act interfered with the children's constitutional
due process rights.z6
If a state court does not apply the ICWA according to the
Act's stated provisions, it may violate the duejprocess rights of the
tribe, to its children and therefore its future; of the Indian par-
ents, to the higher burden imposed by the Act in effectuating vol-
untary terminations of parental rights;28 and of the Indian chil-
dren, to their cultural heritage.3' Therefore, if the ICWA is not
232. See Pima County Juvenile Action S-903,635 P.2d at 189.
233. See supra notes 208-28 and accompanying text.
234. Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152,162 ('Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
235. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1507,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
236. See iL
237. "Reliance on a requirement that the Indian child be part of an Indian family for
the Act to apply would undercut the interests of Indian tribes and Indian children
themselves that Congress sought to protect through the notice, jurisdiction and other
procedural protections set out in [the Act]." In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973,
977 (Alaska 1989).
238. "[T]he interest of a parent in avoiding the termination of his parental rights is
important enough to entitle him to the procedural protections [of] ... Due Process."
Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma v. Rader, 822 F.2d 1493,1497 (10th Cir. 1987).
239. See In re Junious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d 786, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1983) (an Indian
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applied in the Bridget R. case, the voluntary termination provisions
of 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) will have been violated, by the appellate
court's own admission,24° and under 25 U.S.C. § 1914, the tribe may
petition to invalidate the termination of parental rights that set the
case in motion.24
C. Equal Protection Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
Finally, the California court in Bridget R. found that it must
determine "whether ICWA is constitutionally overbroad if applied
to racially Indian children whose families have no social, cultural
or political relationship with a tribal community."242 The court
found that an equal protection challenge arose because
ICWA requires Indian children who cannot be cared for
by their natural parents to be treated differently from
non-Indian children in the same situation. As a result of
this disparate treatment, the number and variety of adop-
tive homes that are potentially available to an Indian
child are more limited than those available to non-Indian
children.... To the extent this disparate and sometimes
disadvantageous treatment is based upon social, cultural
or political relationships between Indian children and
their tribes, it does not violate the equal protection re-
quirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, where such social, cultural or political relation-
ships do not exist or are very attenuated, the only remain-
ing basis for applying ICWA rather than state law ... is
the child's genetic heritage-in other words, race.243
Once again, however, the California court has approached the
issue of the federal statute's application by asking the wrong ques-
tion. In fact, seen in light of the equal protection question posed
by the California court, the existing Indian family requirement
makes no sense. A newborn Indian child, and arguably any Indian
child up to a certain age, whether or not raised in an existing In-
mother contended that by not applying the Act and giving notice to the tribe of pend-
ing custody proceedings the trial court "violated the minor's due process rights." Id at
789, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 41. The California court concluded that "notice to the tribe was
required." Id.).
240. See Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1491,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
241. See 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1994).
242. Bridget R., 41 Cal App. 4th at 1509 n.13, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 528 n.13 (emphasis
omitted).
243. Id. at 1508,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527 (citations omitted).
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dian family, will have no ties to the tribe at all. Clearly, the point
of the ICWA is to ensure that the child and the child's tribe have
the opportunity to establish significant ties. This "opportunity in-
terest" in establishing a relationship with a child is the same one
that courts have upheld in non-Indian unwed father cases. 244 In the
case of an Indian child, not only is the parent's constitutional right
to a relationship or an opportunity to establish a relationship with
the child protected, but the tribe's right to stand in loco parentis
and preserve or establish a relationship with its children is pro-
tected.
The determination of whether the statute's application vio-
lates equal protection requirements is therefore not dependent
upon the child's "social, cultural or political" relationship with the
tribe, but on the tribe's historical political relationship with the
federal government. "It is in this historical and legal context that
the constitutional validity of the Indian preference [in this case, to
be placed with an Indian family] is to be determined."24
The requirements of equal protection provide that persons
similarly situated be treated alike under the law. Any disparate
treatment must be justified by a reasonable difference in circum-
stance.247 This "circumstance" in federal law respecting Indians is
the semi-sovereign status of the tribes and their special relation-
ship with the federal government.2" Exercising its trust relation-
ship with the tribes, "Congress repeatedly has enacted various
preferences... to give Indians a greater participation in their own
self-government."249
These preferences afforded to Indian tribes have spawned
244. See, eg., In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 460-62 (Ga. 1987) (construing
the United States Supreme Court decisions also relied upon by the In re Bridget R.
court: Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972)); see also In Re Adoption of Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th 1043, 1052, 898 P.2d 891,
896, 43 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450 (1995) (unwed father has a "constitutional right.., to de-
velop a parental relationship with his child"); In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th
816, 838, 823 P.2d 1216, 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615, 627 (1992) (unwed father has
"constitutional protection if the father grasps the opportunity to develop... [a] rela-
tionship").
245. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,553 (1974). See supra notes 14-37 and accom-
panying text.
246. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); see also
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 992 (1978).
247. See COHEN, supra note 28, at 653.
248. See supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text.
249. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541.
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challenges based on the claim that such federal law singles out In-
dians either for perceived advantages or disadvantages as a legis-
lative classification based upon race and therefore violates the
equal protection requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth
AmendmentsY0 However, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently upheld all federal legislation regarding Indians as not
violating equal protection requirements because
[t]he preference [at issue] is not directed towards a 'racial'
group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to
members of 'federally recognized' tribes. This operates to
exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified
as 'Indians.' In this sense, the preference is political
rather than racial in nature.25
Therefore, the Court has determined that "[a]s long as the special
treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's
unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments
will not be disturbed."' 2
The Supreme Court has further determined that because the
250. See id. at 535 (employment placement preferences); United States v. Antelope,
430 U.S. 641 (1977) (regulation of crime in Indian country); Fisher v. District Court, 424
U.S. 382 (1976) (preference for tribal jurisdiction in an Indian child custody proceed-
ing). However, challenges that the ICWA violates equal protection requirements have
been made both by parties desiring the application of the ICWA and by parties seeking
to avoid its application. The claims tend to fall into three categories. In the first cate-
gory are individual members of Indian tribes who argue that the rights and protections
afforded the tribe subject them to disadvantageous treatment and deny them equal
status with non-Indians who are not subject to the provisions of the Act. See, e.g., In re
D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278 (S.D. 1980). This is also the position the Bridget R. court takes
on behalf of the Indian children. See 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1508-10, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
527-28. The second category consists of Indian tribes who seek to have the Act applied
in order to retain the equal protection afforded other Indians. See, e.g., Navajo Nation
v. Hodel, 645 F. Supp. 825 (D. Ariz. 1986). The third category consists of non-Indians
who argue that the special rights and protections conferred on Indians by the Act must
also be afforded non-Indians or else the legislation violates non-Indians' equal protec-
tion rights. See, e.g., In re W.E.G., 710 P.2d 410 (Alaska 1985). This third category rep-
resents the basis for a growing movement among African-Americans and other minori-
ties for same race adoption preferences. See generally Mike McKee, Fostering Color
Blindness; A Legal and Political Backlash is Mounting Against California's Race-
Conscious Adoption Policies, THE RECORDER, Aug. 25,1995.
251. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
252. Id at 555. However, because of this political affiliation between the tribes, as
semi-sovereign nations, and the federal government, the Supreme Court has expressly
limited such legislation to Indian tribes. The Court has noted that the legal status of the
tribes is "sui generis," id. at 554, and refused to extend the "political" classification be-
yond the tribes. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 304 n.42
(1978).
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preference afforded the tribes in federal legislation
does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather
from the quasi-sovereign status of the ...Tribe under
federal law[,] ... even if a... holding occasionally results
in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-
Indian has access, such disparate treatment of the Indian
is justified because it is intended to benefit the class of
which he is a member by furthering the congressional
policy of Indian self-government.23
Therefore, even in a case which severely disadvantaged individual
tribal members-by subjecting them to a first degree murder
charge under the felony-murder provisions of the Major Crimes
Act rather than charging them under state law which had no fel-
ony-murder provisions-the Court found that individual Indians
were "not subject[] to the [federal criminal legislation] because
they are of the Indian race but because they are enrolled members
of the... tribe."
In United States v. Antelope then, the Supreme Court ex-
tended its past rulings in Morton v. Mancari and Fisher v. District
Court, which based their holdings on the governmental purpose of
encouraging tribal self-government through hiring preferences and
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, respectively. In Ante-
lope the Court included as part of the "unique obligation to Indian
tribes," the "federal regulation of criminal conduct within Indian
country[,]" 5 which benefits the "class of which [the individual In-
dian] is a member." 6  This history of decisions by the United
States Supreme Court leaves no doubt that "federal legislation
with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such,
is not based upon impermissible racial classifications." '' Rather,
"[t]he essential question [is] whether legislation which may oper-
ate to disadvantage Indians can be tied to the fulfillment of the
253. Fisher, 424 U.S. at 390-91 (holding, in a pre-ICWA case, that the tribe had ju-
risdiction over an Indian child custody proceeding, even though the Indian individuals
were denied access to state court, which would have been available to non-Indians).
254. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646.
255. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646.
256. Fisher, 424 U.S. at 391. Although in Antelope the Supreme Court did not reach
the question of "whether nonenrolled Indians are subject" to the federal legislation in
question, 430 U.S. at 646-47 n.7, a year later the Court held, in United States v. John,
437 U.S. 634 (1978) that federal legislation could be applied to Indians based on having
enrolled members of federally recognized tribes as ancestors. See id!
257. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645.
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federal government's unique obligation to Indian tribes. "2
Although the Supreme Court did not have an equal protection
challenge before it in the only case it has considered involving the
ICWA, 2 the history of decisions upholding federal Indian legisla-
tion from equal protection challenges has allowed state courts
consistently to uphold the ICWA's application also.2 °  These
courts reason that "[t]he provisions of the ICWA were deemed by
Congress to be essential for the protection of Indian culture and to
assure the very existence of Indian tribes.... [This protection] is a
permissible goal that is rationally tied to the fulfillment of Con-
gress's unique guardianship obligation toward Indians."2 1 And
since the congressional obligation is toward the tribes, rather than
the individual member-making the provisions of the ICWA de-
pendent upon a political rather than racial classification-such ob-
ligation does not depend upon the "social, cultural or political"
relationship of the individual Indian child or parent to the tribe.
The Act can therefore be constitutionally applied regardless of
whether the state court deems individual Indians to be an existing
Indian family and regardless of whether the state court decides
that application of the Act to a specific Indian child constitutes
"disparate and.., disadvantageous treatment" because the child is
denied the opportunity to be placed in a non-Indian home. 2
Finally, even under the strict scrutiny test demanded by the
California court in cases in which the Indian child is not removed
from what the court determines to be an existing Indian family, the
application of the Act passes constitutional muster. Although the
California court finds application of the Act in such circumstances
258. See Ralph W. Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54
WASH. L. REV. 587,603 (1979) (emphasis added).
259. See Mississipi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). The
United States Supreme Court did uphold an equal protection challenge in an Indian
child custody case before the enactment of the ICWA in Fisher, 424 U.S. at 385, which
was widely looked to by Congress in drafting the ICWA. Fisher, however, may be dis-
tinguished as a case in which all parties involved were members of the tribe living on
the reservation.
260. See, e.g., In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060 (II1. App. Ct. 1990); In re Angus, 655
P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); In re D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278 (S.D. 1980). ,
261. Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1068 (citations omitted); see also Angus, 655 P.2d at 213
(stating that "'there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and in-
tegrity of Indian tribes than their children'.. . . [T]he protection of the integrity of In-
dian families [is] a permissible goal that is rationally tied to the fulfillment of Congress's
unique guardianship obligation toward the Indians .... ") (citations omitted).
262. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1508,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527.
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"inherently suspect," 26 as being based solely on a racial classifica-
tion, it admits that even in such circumstances the classification is
constitutional if the legislation is a "narrowly tailored measure[]
that further[s] compelling governmental interests." 26'
First, the ICWA is "narrowly tailored" in that it applies only
to federally recognized tribes?5 with whom the United States gov-
ernment has a political connection as a semi sovereign nation. The
Act, and other federal Indian legislation, does not apply, for ex-
ample, to Canadian or Mexican Indians to whom the United States
government owes no trust responsibility.261 The narrow tailoring of
the Act is apparent in Bridget R. itself. The children's mother is
racially "Indian," as a member of the Mexican Yaqui tribe, but
since she does not claim membership with the only federally-
recognized Yaqui tribe in Arizona,267 it is the Indian children's fa-
ther's tribe alone which has claim to the children under the Act
and is a party to the suit.
Second, the Act is narrowly tailored to apply only to Indian
children of members of a federally recognized tribe.26 And, like a
tribe which may voluntarily terminate its political relationship with
the federal government,269 "an individual Indian [tribal member]
possesses the.., right to withdraw from his tribe and forever live
away from it, as though it had no further existence, ' '27 and there-
fore sever himself or herself from any unwanted application of
federal law applying to the tribes.27'
263. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90).
264. Id.(citation omitted); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,342-43 (1972).
265. Eligible tribes are those recognized by the Secretary of the Interior. See 25
U.S.C. § 1903(8) (1994). Such tribes may lose their status as a federally recognized
tribe by congressional termination of relations with the tribe, or by voluntary aban-
donment of tribal organization. See COHEN, supra note 28, at 17-18.
266. See, e.g., In re Wanomi P., 216 Cal. App. 3d 156, 264 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1989); see
also Johnson & Crystal, supra note 258, at 603.
267. See Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1492 nA, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516 n.4.
268. Membership may be established either through enrollment or by having ances-
tors who were enrolled members. See John, 437 U.S. at 650.
269. See supra note 265.
270. United States ex reL Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 699 (C.C.D. Neb.
1879) (No. 14,891).
271. See Johnson & Crystal, supra note 258, at 593 n.45. For example, the Indian
mother in Holyfield could presumably have renounced her membership with the tribe if
she did not want the ICWA applied and her child raised on the reservation. However,
renouncing tribal membership is rare, since the individual member may lose tribal
privileges in addition to avoiding the unwanted federal Indian legislation. Therefore,
termination of the tribal relationship "will not lightly be inferred." COHEN, supra note
28, at 22 (citations omitted). Had the mother in Holyfield renounced her membership,
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Finally, although the California court found that "ICWA's
purpose is not served by an application of the Act to children who
are of Indian descent, but whose parents have no significant rela-
tionship with an Indian community," 272 the Act is a "measure n that
further[s] compelling government interests" in preserving the very
"existence and integrity of Indian tribes' 73 by preventing the re-
moval of their children both physically and culturally.27 4 The con-
gressional findings underlying the ActP5 show Congress's concern
with past state and federal policies and practices that put tribal
self-government and self-determination, as provided for in the In-
dian Reorganization Act,26 at risk. "After such findings have been
made, the governmental interest in preferring members of the in-
jured groups at the expense of others is substantial, since the legal
rights of the victims must be vindicated." 277 Therefore, the gov-
ernment interest is "compelling," and a showing has been made, as
the California court would require, "that application of the state
law in question would do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial
federal interests."' 278
IV. CONCLUSION
Requiring that an Indian child be removed from what a state
court deems an existing Indian family in order for the rights and
protections of the ICWA to apply in a custody proceeding is a
continuation of the abuse of tribal self-government and self-
determination which gave rise to the ICWA and other federal leg-
islation regarding Indians in the first place. The "prior abusive
child welfare practices [that] may have cut off large numbers of
she would have had to leave the reservation herself. Instead, she attempted to avoid
the application of the ICWA by giving birth to the child off the reservation. See Holy-
field, 490 U.S. at 38-39. She apparently planned to move back to the reservation herself
once the child had been placed for adoption.
The possibility for an individual Indian to renounce tribal membership and
thus distance him or herself from federal legislation applied to federally recognized
tribes and their members, has often been cited as another reason that federal legisla-
tion regarding Indians is not "racially" based. No members of any other race can
voluntarily escape their status. See COHEN, supra note 28, at 656.
272. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1509-10,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 528.
273. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
274. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
276. 25 U.S.C. § 461.
277. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
278. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1510, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 528 (citations omitted).
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persons from their Indian heritage" ' are not only the reason the
ICWA was enacted but may also account for the present genera-
tion of Indian parents' apparent "assimilation" into non-Indian
culture. But for these practices, some Indian parents might have
been raised on the reservation, or at least have, managed to retain
some ties to the tribe and their culture.20
These past abuses, therefore, must not be parlayed into a reason to
prevent tribes from trying to regain their children and exercise
their "opportunity interest' 1 to create "social, cultural and politi-
cal" ties with children who are members of the tribe or eligible for
membership as children of a now-assimilated member. Nor should
past abuses be used to prevail against the government's
"fundamental assumption that it is in the Indian child's best inter-
est that its relationship to the tribe be protected. ,,22 In an eloquent
testimony of the need for the ICWA now as much as ever, a non-
Indian woman who adopted an Indian child in the 1960's-before
the ICWA-has written, "Before lawmakers encourage adoptions
of Indian children by non-Indian families, before they remove
tribal jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, before state
courts interpret 'good cause' as economic superiority, they need to
acknowledge the strength of the biological and cultural ties that
Indian tribes can offer their children." Her son's return to the
tribe as an adult prompted her conclusion that "[a]lthough [he]
grew up happy in our home, the positive change in my son once he
touched his roots.., makes me think that the pull of the ingrained
cultural memory is stronger than even the most loving adoptive
bonds."2 4
This woman's Indian son did find his culture again, and some
children who have been denied that chance initially by a state
court's imposition of an existing Indian family requirement on the
application of the ICWA, may do so also. But at best, a state
279. In re Adoption of M. John Doe, 832 P.2d 518, 521 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(citation omitted).
280. See id at 521-22. The court distinguished In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash.
1992), on the ground that the Indian parent in the case before it had been removed
from the reservation as a child and placed in a non-Indian home. See id. However, his
child still had relatives on the reservation with whom she could be placed, even though
she was not being removed from an "existing Indian family." Id at 521.
281. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
282. In re Pima County Juvenile Action S-903, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App,
1981).
283. Linda Hodges, Blood Ties, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,1996, at A15.
284. Id
[Vol. 30:647
EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION
court's initial refusal to apply the ICWA delays conferring the
special rights and protections afforded the tribes and Indian chil-
dren, as a case works its way through the legal system. Even if the
tribe eventually obtains jurisdiction over the matter, such a delay is
often an impediment to applying the Act's placement preferences.
In Holyfield, for example, the United States Supreme Court la-
mented the fact that "over three years have passed since the twin
babies were born and placed in the [non-Indian] home... [and]
separation at this point would doubtless cause considerable
pain. '28 However, as the Supreme Court felt compelled to point
out:
[h]ad the mandate of the ICWA been followed in 1986
[when adoption proceeding began] much potential an-
guish might have been avoided, and in any case the law
cannot be applied so as automatically to "reward those
who obtain custody, whether lawfully or otherwise, and
maintain it during any ensuing (and protracted) litiga-
tion., 6
The Court, clearly believing that hard cases make bad law, there-
fore applied the ICWA and turned the case over to the
"experience, wisdom, and compassion of the.., tribal courts. '"2
After so many years, however, the tribal court did not feel that
it could remove the twins from their non-Indian home, and al-
lowed the adoption of the children by the non-Indian mother. 2
Similarly, in Halloway, the tribal court that eventually heard the
case left the Indian child with the non-Indian parents who had
adopted him in violation of the ICWA six years before, although
making him legally the son of his Indian mother who would retain
specified visiting rights.n9 Thus, while the ICWA was finally found
applicable, the placement preferences it provides to insure that an
Indian child be placed with an Indian family were thwarted by the
delay.
The same will be true in Bridget R., should the ICWA even-
tually be found applicable. 290 The facts of the case are very much
285. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,53 (1989).
286. hi at 53-54 (quoting In re Hafloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986)).
287. Id
288. See Marcia Coyle, After the Gavel Comes Down: It's Never Quite Over When
It's Over, Parties Before the Supreme Court Find Out, NAT'L. LJ., Feb. 25,1991, at 1.
289. See T.R. Reid, Mormon-Navajo Adoption Fight Settled White Couple Keeps
Indian Child Biological Mother Retains Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 30,1987, at A3.
290. The delay in application of the Act in In re Bridget R. will continue. Although
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like those in Holyfield, in that if the Act had been applied at the
time the adoption proceedings began, the children would never
have been placed with a non-Indian family. Even if the Act had
been applied three months later, when the parents and tribe inter-
vened to revoke consent to the adoption under § 1913(a), the twins
could easily have been returned to their Indian family. Finally,
even if one and one half years later, the trial judge's application of
the Act and order to return the twins to their Indian family had
been upheld, the children might have been returned to their Indian
family, or at least returned with a provision for dual guardianship,
such as the one the tribal court fashioned in Halloway. Instead,
the twins have spent years being subjected to "extended judicial
torture,"29a and the adoptive parents have been rewarded by ob-
taining and maintaining custody throughout the protracted litiga-
tion.2
Such a result is a tragedy since this case involves a very real
"Indian family," including the twins' biological Indian parents,
their extended paternal Indian family, their tribal family, and their
broad Native American cultural family, all of whom are waiting to
have the twins return to them, physically and culturally.2 3 The
Pomo tribe currently has 225 members, only twenty-five of whom
live on the reservation.2 4 This case has provided them with at least
four more enrolled members, and has returned a family to them
which was separated from the reservation when the twins' father
was seven.2 5 The tribe itself has argued the importance of this,
saying, "'[w]e don't want to lose a single one of our children. They
are our heart and soul."' 296 Under these facts, there seems no
question that the ICWA's stated purpose "to protect the best in-
terests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security
the California Supreme Court denied review on May 15, 1996, the case has been sub-
mitted to the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. In re Bridget R., 41
Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1996), appeal docketed, No. 96-5971 (U.S. Sept.
16,1996).
291. James Rainey, Court Blocks Transfer of Twins to Birth Parents, L.A. TIMES,
June 16,1995, at Bi (quoting attorney for the twins, Arnold Klein).
292. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 54 (quoting Halloway, 732 P.2d at 972.)
293. See supra, note 126-28 and accompanying text.
294. See In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483,1492,49 Cal. Rptr. 507,516 (1996).
295. See Appellant's Answer to Petition for Review to the California Supreme
Court, at 12, In re Bridget R., Nos B093520, B093694 (Mar. 7, 1996) (referring to clerk's
transcript of deposition taken on Aug. 9,1995).
296. James Rainey, A Test of Indian Law, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1995, at Bi (quoting
tribal administrator, Marcellena Becerra).
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of Indian tribes ' '211 would be fulfilled. However, the judicial crea-
tion of the existing Indian family exception has probably again
thwarted congressional intent to fulfill its trust obligation towards
the tribes.
297. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
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